We talk a lot about GPS when discussing transport security. We want to know where the truck is, whether it follows the planned route and whether the cargo reaches its destination safely. But perhaps we should start asking the opposite question as well: what does the truck know about us?
Modern vehicles are increasingly connected environments equipped with telematics, GPS, cameras, microphones, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular connectivity, driver applications and remote software updates. These technologies provide enormous operational benefits, but they also create something that the logistics industry should be discussing much more seriously: data exposure. Recent warnings from European intelligence and security authorities have brought this issue into focus.
The concern is no longer limited to what happens inside a passenger car. Modern vehicles can collect information about their users, movements and surroundings, while some connected systems can potentially be accessed or managed remotely. That immediately raises a much broader question for transport and logistics.
What happens when we apply the same thinking to trucks?
A connected truck can generate extremely valuable operational information. It may reveal where a vehicle travels, where it stops, which warehouses it visits, how long it remains at particular locations and how transport operations are organised. Combine this with information available through telematics platforms, transport systems, driver applications and other connected services, and suddenly we are no longer talking only about vehicle data. We may be talking about supply-chain intelligence.
For a company transporting high-value cargo, pharmaceuticals, electronics, luxury products, sensitive industrial goods or products linked to strategically important customers, this creates an important security question. Who can see where your truck is? The answer may include the driver, carrier, telematics provider, fleet-management platform, logistics operator, vehicle manufacturer, technology subcontractors, cloud providers and, depending on the operational model, the customer itself.
The more important question is whether the cargo owner actually knows who has access and why. This is where cybersecurity and cargo security begin to overlap.
Imagine that an unauthorised person gains access to reliable location information showing that a particular vehicle regularly leaves the same warehouse at a certain time, follows a predictable route, stops at the same parking location and delivers to the same distribution centre. Even without knowing the exact cargo details, this type of information may be useful for organised crime. Information can become part of the preparation for a physical attack.
A criminal group does not necessarily need to defeat the physical security of the truck first if it can understand its movements digitally.
Connected vehicles are already being treated as a security issue
The United States has already approached connected-vehicle technology as a national-security concern. Restrictions introduced around certain vehicle connectivity and automated-driving technologies focus on areas such as telematics, Bluetooth, cellular communication, satellite connectivity and Wi-Fi. The concern is not only data collection. Authorities have also highlighted the potential for remote manipulation and access to sensitive information.
What is particularly interesting for the logistics sector is that the debate is moving beyond passenger cars. Commercial vehicles, including trucks and buses, create an even more complex security environment because their movement may reveal far more than personal travel habits. It can reveal business relationships, warehouse locations, production schedules, distribution routes and patterns within strategically important supply chains.
European countries are asking similar questions. Security services have examined what connected vehicles collect, where information is transferred and how cameras, microphones, radar, location systems and communication modules could create security risks around sensitive locations.
Poland has also begun considering restrictions around some vehicles entering protected military areas. But from a supply-chain security perspective, I think there is a danger in reducing the entire discussion to one question: where was the vehicle manufactured?
That is too simple. The more useful questions are technology-neutral.
What data does the vehicle collect? Where is that data stored? Where is the backend located? Who processes the information? Which external providers have access? What data is transmitted through the telematics system? Which applications are connected to the vehicle? How are software updates managed? How is remote access authenticated? How long is location history retained? What happens to the data when the vehicle visits a sensitive warehouse, factory, laboratory, distribution centre or customer location? The manufacturer is only one part of the risk.
The complete digital ecosystem matters.
The truck is only one node in a much larger network
A connected truck may send data to a telematics platform. That platform may be integrated with the carrier's transport management system. The TMS may exchange data with the logistics operator or customer. The driver may use a mobile application containing shipment information. Another system may manage parking, fuel, electronic locks or route planning. Information may then pass through multiple technology providers and subcontractors.
Each connection improves efficiency, but every connection also creates another dependency and another potential access point. This is particularly important when companies transport high-value or sensitive cargo. For years, transport security has focused primarily on protecting the physical shipment. We verify the carrier, secure the trailer, monitor the route, plan safe parking and install electronic locks or tracking devices. All of that remains important.
But perhaps protecting the cargo should now also mean protecting the information that describes the cargo's movement. A criminal does not necessarily need to know exactly what is inside the trailer if they can identify which warehouse it leaves, where it stops and where it regularly delivers. Patterns themselves can have value.
This changes the way companies should assess transport partners. It is no longer enough to ask whether the truck has GPS. We should also ask who can access the GPS data. It is not enough to know that a telematics platform is used. We should understand where its data is stored, who manages the system and what happens if an account is compromised. It is not enough to ask whether the driver has a mobile application.
We should know what information that application contains, what permissions it requires and how access is removed when the driver no longer works for the company. This is the same shift we are already seeing elsewhere in supply-chain security. Physical controls and digital controls can no longer be managed as separate worlds.
High-value cargo requires a different type of due diligence
If I were selecting a transport partner for high-value cargo today, I would still ask about route monitoring, secure parking, locks, driver verification and subcontracting. But I would add another group of questions.
Who has access to vehicle-generated data? Which telematics provider is used? How is access to the platform controlled? Is multi-factor authentication required? Are user permissions reviewed? Are subcontractors able to view shipment locations? Can location data be downloaded or shared? How are cyber incidents handled? What happens when a telematics account is compromised? Are vehicle software updates managed and controlled? Which third-party applications connect to the vehicle or transport systems? These questions may sound technical, but their consequences are completely operational.
If somebody gains unauthorised access to a transport system, the result may not be stolen data alone. It could reveal routes, schedules, loading locations and operational patterns. It could support social engineering. It could help someone impersonate a legitimate participant in the transport process. And if the attacker can influence instructions rather than simply observe them, the risk becomes even more serious.
That is why modern cargo security should not focus exclusively on the physical integrity of the vehicle. It should also focus on the integrity of the information surrounding the transport.
The next security audit may need to look inside the digital ecosystem
The connected truck brings enormous benefits. Better route planning, predictive maintenance, driver safety, fuel optimisation, real-time visibility and more accurate ETAs all depend on data. The answer is therefore not to disconnect vehicles or stop using technology. The answer is to understand the risk created by connectivity and manage it properly. For me, this leads to a very simple conclusion. A modern truck is no longer only a vehicle carrying cargo from point A to point B.
It is also a connected device moving through warehouses, factories, distribution centres, customer sites and sometimes highly sensitive locations. It collects, generates, and transmits information.And that information can have business value. If it has value to the organisation, it may also have value to somebody who was never supposed to receive it. So when we audit a transport partner, perhaps we should stop looking only at the physical security of the truck.
We should start asking about its digital ecosystem as well. Because the next cargo-security incident may not begin with somebody cutting a trailer. It may begin with someone gaining access to the data that tells them exactly where that trailer will be.